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SHOULD COLORADO RETAIN THE "GUEST STATUTE"? PUBLIC POLICY v. INSURANCE POLICY
By

KENNETH

N.

KRIPKE

Kenneth N. Kripke took his pre-law work
at Ohio State University and received his
LL.B. degree from the University of Colorado in 1948. He has practiced law in
Denver since 1949 and is a partner in the
law firm of Kripke and McLean. Mr. Kripke
is president of the Association of Colorado
Claimants' Attorneys, a member of the
board of governors of the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys
and an associate editor of the NACCA Law
Journal.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sometimes the best interests of the public, and the best interests of
America's powerful casualty companies meet at loggerheads. It is the
purpose of this paper to demonstrate that the Colorado guest statute is
undesirable from the standpoint of the public welfare, and that the
arguments which have been advanced in its favor do not stand up under
scrutiny.
The Colorado guest statute was drafted by Kenneth M. Wormwood,
prominent Denver defense lawyer.' Credit for its enactment has been
claimed by the American Automobile Association, which recently said
in its club paper: "Back in 1931 when this law was put on the books,
Club President Clarence Werthan was instrumental in convincing the
General Assembly that such legislation was needed."'
If.

ANALYSIS

OF ARGUMENTS

ADVANCED

IN

SUPPORT

OF

THE

"GUEST STATUTE"

A. It has been said that the guest statute prevents claims from
hitch-hikers and others, who are given free rides as a generous gesture on
the part of the driver. This argument does not take into account that
under the common law even the guest must prove the host was negligent, must prove proximate cause, and must defend against the charges
of his own contributory negligence or his assumption of the risk.' When
one is invited to ride in an automobile, the driver certainly should owe
him a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of that vehicle.
1

Proceedings, Colo. Bar Ass'n Negligence Section 34 (1956).

in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-9-1

The statute appears

(1953).

2 28 Rocky Mtn. Motorist 1 (Feb. 1958).
3 Despite the opinion in

Pettingell v.

Moede,

129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1030 (1954),

discussed elsewhere in this paper, many trial courts are still setting forth the guest
statute verbatim in their instructions to juries and are submitting instructions on
negligence and contributory negligence.
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If an injury is sustained as the result. of the driver's ordinary negligence,
the guest passenger should be entitled to recover damages for his injuries. The relationship of guest and driver is not different from the

relationship between guest and host in a motor boat, in an airplane, or
in a home. By insuring against the risk of negligent injury to his guests,
a host protects his friends and neighbors, and insures their continued
friendship.
1931 was a year of depression, a year when hitch-hikers were seen
frequently along the roadside. As was explained in Dobbs v. Sugioka,' the
statute was justified on the basis that it prevented recoveries by such

people as were given rides by generous motorists. But, tragically, the
broad language of the law has defeated the claims of innumerable deserving victims of injury who could not under any circumstances be
classified as "bums" or hitch-hikers. There is nothing in the statute to
limit its application to such individuals. It applies equally to neighbors,
co-workers, friends, relatives, and all who ride in automobiles as guests.
B. It has been said that there could be many "fake" claims where
passengers might take advantage of an accident to collect huge sums of
money for pretended injuries.' Does this mean that we do not trust
our court system to decide between meritorious claims and fraudulent
ones? Does it mean that there is no control in our courts over excessive
verdicts and judgments? If it does mean those things, then we have no
effective judicial system in this country. This fallacious argument not
only underestimates our court system, but also presumes dishonorable

conduct by claimants as a sweeping generality. This writer is not ready
to accept such cynical propositions. In a significant dissenting opinion in
Noakes v. Gaiser,' Mr. Justice Frantz said:

"The compelling idea for the sanction of such legislation is
the notion that guests have been guilty of collusion, fraud and
bad faith in advancing claims. In other words, presumptively
guest and host frequently connive in the pressing of claims in
order to mulct the insurance carrier. Admittedly, such instances
have occurred and will occur, but what should be done with the
great number of bona fide claims based upon negligence? Such
presumption of dishonorable conduct on the part of host and
guest is contrary to the presumption generally prevailing of fair
dealing and common honesty."'
C. It has also been argued that if we did not have a guest statute
our courts would be cluttered with cases. An argument like this is poor

justification for any law. If it is just and proper that an injured guest
should recover, how can we deny him access to the courts on the excuse
that the courts are too crowded? Obviously, we should design the facilities of our courts to fit the case load, rather than limit the case load by
the available facilities.

Speaking for the court in Canon City v. Merris,' Mr. Justice Frantz
attacked this idea of expediency in the solution of legal problems. He
said: "A resort to expediency in the law is always dangerous; the indi4 117 Colo. 218, 185 P.2d 784 (1947).
5 See note 2 supra.
6 315 P.2d 183 (Colo. 1957).
7 Id. at 189.
8 323 P.2d 614 (Colo. 1958).
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vidual dignity of the person and his rights are likely to be trammeled
when such becomes the recourse of the law."'
Indeed, the guest statute has itself resulted in some cluttering. By
actual count, there have been thirty-four cases in our supreme court
construing the guest statute. Each new opinion raises further litigation.
The confusing and self-contradictory language of the statute is destined
to spawn more and more cases until our supreme court finally declares
the statute unconstitutional, or until our legislature repeals it. Lawyers
who look to these thirty-four cases for guidance find only a confused
maze of contradictory decisions defining and re-defining, but never quite
explaining what must be proved in a guest case. In nearly all of these
cases the supreme court has been forced to engage in judicial fact-finding, adding up the facts, and deciding whether a particular situation
falls on this side or that side of a wavering line. Given a specific fact
situation, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant seems to have difficulty 10in finding some of these thirty-four cases favorable to his point of
view.
D. We have been told that the guest statute holds down insurance
rates. That is undoubtedly true. But would it not be better to pay a
higher premium for more adequate protection? The public is paying the
bill anyway, although not in the form of insurance premiums. It is paid
in taxes to support public hospitals and welfare institutions where impoverished victims of the guest statute are always to be found. It is
paid through contributions to charities, religious and non-religious,
which every day spend fabulous sums of money to succor the impoverished victims of this legal vacuum called the guest statute. Insurance
has proved its usefulness in this age of speed and twisted metal by spreading the risk of injury, so that the suffering and the bereaved will not
have to bear the full brunt of the economic incidents of their misfortunes. The victim of ordinary negligence is usually protected by the
tortfeasor's liability insurance policy. There should be no difference
when the negligence is that of a driver and the injured person is a nonpaying passenger. The suffering and the loss are the same. The objective
of insurance is not to hold down rates but is to spread the risk. It is so
obvious that it should go without saying that this objective of spreading the risk is better accomplished without a guest statute.
E. I'Ve have heard it argued that domestic harmony would be
disrupted if members of the same family were permitted to sue one another. This is pure conjecture, and the result may very well be the opposite. Nothing disrupts domestic harmony so much as the financial
hardship and worry resulting from sudden and unexpected medical
expenses and loss of income. It is more likely that compensation through
insurance would result in improved domestic tranquility. Then too, our
present statute does not forbid suits among members of the same family, it merely forces them to charge willful and wanton misconduct.
9 Id. at 616.
10 Here are some interesting statistics: Twenty-seven of these thirty-four appeals
were made by defendants, and only seven by plaintiffs. This would seem to indicate
that, generally speaking. defendants are better able to finance appeals than are
injured plaintiffs. Only twice has the court upset a defendant's decision below, but
the supreme court has reversed judgments in favor of the plaintiff fifteen times.
Possibly the attitude of the people, as reflected by juries, is more liberal toward
claimants than has been the attitude of the supreme court.
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F. We have heard the argument that the guest statute provides a
clear and concise yardstick with which liability can be determined. We
have already demonstrated the volume of litigation which has attempted
so unsuccessfully to tell us what the statute really means. Let us look
again at the statute.
What is the meaning of the phrase, "unless such accident shall have
been intentional"? Several cases have dealt with this internal conflict
of accident versus intention. Mr. Justice Holland, dissenting in Ling v.
Pease," said that in his opinion the clear intent of the legislature in
enacting the law was to limit liability of the driver or owner to "intentional accident, intoxication and willful and wanton disregard of the
rights of others."'" At that time we were not enlightened as to the
meaning of the term "intentional accident." Later, in Lewis v. Oliver,"
the same judge, then writing for the court, again mentioned "intentional
accident" as one of the three conditions which must be established
by the plaintiff, but added in parenthesis " (if anyone knows what that
means) ."1

In Pettingell v. Moede," Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the court,
said: "The language of the Statute is unfortunate in at least two particulars, the first of which is intentional accident. It immediately is
clear that where one intentionally wrecks a motor vehicle, that is no
accident. With this, however, we are not here concerned ... 16
Justice Holland wrote another dissent in Noakes v. Gaiser, and
said:
"The inconceivable terms found in the above statute
makes (sic) our statute different in some respects to the socalled guest statutes of other states. Witness: '.

.

. unless such

accident shall have been intentional on the part of such owner
or operator. ...

.'If

what happened here or in other similar

cases was 'intentional', then it was not accidental ..

""

What happens to our "clear and concise yardstick" when we
attempt to decide what "intentional accident" means? This writer submits that in all of the thirty-four Colorado Supreme Court cases we
have never been told what those words mean. This, we believe, is because the court cannot tell us what those words mean. There is something wrong with a statute that cannot be construed.
But let us examine the statute further. It says "or by negligence
consisting of a willful and wanton disregard of the rights of others."
What does this mean? In the early case of Millington v. Hiedloff,8 the
court apparently did not see the contradition between the terms "negligence" on the one hand, and "willful and wanton" on the other. In the
Millington case the court stated that in order for an injured plaintiff
to succeed he must prove not only negligence, but also willfulness. In
11 123 Colo. 518, 232 P.2d 189 (1951).
Id. at 526, 232 P.2d at 193.
13 129 Colo. 479. 271 P.2d 1055 (1954).
14 Id. at 481, 271 P.2d at 1056.
15 129 Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038 (1954).
16 Id.
at 490, 271 P.2d at 1042.
17 315 P.2d 183, 184 (1957).
1s 96 Colo. 581, 45 P.2d 937 (1935).
12
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another case decided on the same day, the court declared that the phrase
"willful and wanton disregard" presents no serious problem, and that
its meaning "seems so self-evident that attempts at further definition
involve the risk of explaining 'what seems most clear so clearly that it
seems perplexed'."" The court went on to assert that willful and wanton
means just about the same thing as wanton and reckless.
As the cases piled up, little light was shed upon this contradiction
in terms until 1951, when Mr. Justice Holland in a dissent described
the word "negligence" in the statute as "a meaningless expression.""0
It was his opinion that the statute required something beyond negligence, therefore the words "negligence" and "contributory negligence"
have no proper place in a guest statute case. At this point it occurred
to the writer that if words such as "accident" and "negligence" must
be completely stricken from the statute in order to Puzzle out its meaning, is not the statute too vague for enforcement?
Returning to the case of Pettingell v. Moede, that opinion asserted
that if a thing is intentionally clone it is done through neither negligence nor accident. Judge Holland repeated this seemingly irrefutable
idea in his dissent in a 1957 case."
The Pettingell case also tells us that the word "willful" means
intentional or purposeful, and "wanton" connotes an even higher degree
of culpability, even at times implying evil.
19 Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 7, 45
20 Ling v. Pease. 123 Colo. 518, 526;
Noakes v. Gaiser. 315 P.2d 1S3. 1S4
22Pettingell v. Moede. 129 Colo. 484,

21
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3661,C

P.2d 940, 941
232 P.2d 189,
(Colo. 1957)
491, 271 P.2d

(193o).
193 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
(dissenting opinion).
1038, 1042 (1954).
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Apparently, we are now at this point in the development of the
legal construction of this confusing statute: the words "accident" and
"negligence" must be read out of the statute completely. The words
"willful and wanton" connote an intentional or purposeful act. Let
us
then return to the statute and paraphrase it as it now seems to be construed:
"No person transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such
owner or operator for injury, death or loss ..., unless . . . intentional on the part of such owner or operator or caused by his
intoxication, or by . . . (intentional) disregard of the rights
of others."
To say this is an entirely unnatural result is to put it mildly. It is far
from the original language found in the statute. We have here a meaningless jumble of conflicting terms, and no amount of judicial patchwork or elimination of words can give the law a clear meaning. As a
practical matter the supreme court can do nothing but guess at what
the legislature really intended.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GUEST STATUTE
The Colorado Constitution is a creation of the citizens of this
state, and represents their desires concerning their government. In
Noakes v. Gaiser, the parties did not raise the constitutional issue, nor
has this issue ever been raised in any of the thirty-four Colorado cases.
However, Mr. Justice Frantz, dissenting in Noakes, contended that the
statute violates a constitutional guarantee, "That courts of justice shall
be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury
to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay."23
When one considers that the Colorado guest statute precludes the
courts from considering many negligence actions which would have
been justiciable at common law, he begins to understand the strength
of Justice Frantz's argument. The statute does not merely curtail a
common law action, it totally eliminates it. The constitutional violation
is clear and obvious. It cannot be ignored. No purpose is to be served
by further detailing the important dissenting opinions in this case,
but one other quotation deserves repeating:
"We render threadbare the fundamental fabric of government, our Constitution, if we sanction legislation such as the
guest statute. The language of our Constitution is significant;
and if we would but seek we may seize the profoundest and
most far-reaching meaning, by turning over each familiar word,
and looking at it in the light of the primitive idea it was used
to designate. Such quest for meaning would go far in restoring
vigor and vitality to this fundamental document.''24
Mr. Justice Moore wrote a concurring opinion in Canon City v.
Merris, in which he stated:
"I deem it to be the duty of this court to breathe life and
23 315 P.2d 185, citing Colo. Const. art. II,
by Judge Frantz).
24 315 P.2d at 189 (dissenting opinion).

§ 6 (dissenting opinion, emphasis added
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vitality into the constitutions of the state and the nation, to
the end that they shall in a practical way accomplish for the
individual the objectives intended by the people who adopted
them as the supreme law of the land. I am not interested in
mental gymnastics, the purpose of which is to search for some
plausible excuse for holding a constitutional provision to be
an empty shell when resorted to by one for whose benefit the
provision was unquestionably intended.
"The danger which threatens our democratic processes
does not stem from the actions of appellate courts which give
strength, vitality and new life to constitutional provisions. The
danger is that all too often courts of last resort fritter away
constitutional protections, and little by little destroy the basic
freedoms of which we speak so often and which we actually
apply too seldom in bringing them within the reach of the
citizen.""
CONCLUSION

IV.

The Colorado automobile guest statute has done far more harm
than good. The best that can be said for it is that it has held down
insurance rates, but this is of questionable benefit to those unfortunate
members of our public who have been victims of this statute's rigorous
and confusing terms. It is to be hoped that the Colorado Supreme Court
will wipe this obnoxious law from our law books before it does even
further damage. If the guest statute has not been invalidated by court
action before the 1959 session of the Colorado Legislature meets, our
elected representatives should take the initiative and repeal it.
25 323 P.2d 614, 623, 624 (Colo. 1958).
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